The limits of stowaway searches: Lessons from recent incidents

Two stowaway incidents involving vessels calling at West African ports have highlighted weaknesses in shipboard searches and the limitations of third-party security checks, according to Skuld.

As explained by Jia Hong Liu, Vice President, Technical Manager at Skuld, a total of 14 stowaways remained undetected despite searches conducted using trained dogs. In both incidents, seven individuals were discovered several days after departure, having concealed themselves in areas that should have been included in systematic physical inspections.

The cases underline the difference between having security measures in place and ensuring their effectiveness. While professional security services can provide additional protection, Skuld emphasizes that they should not replace thorough physical searches conducted by the vessel’s own crew. 

What happened?

Case 1: Seven stowaways concealed in a crane house

In early August 2026, seven stowaways were discovered aboard a vessel several days after departure, when they emerged from their hiding place.

The individuals claimed to have boarded the vessel at Tema, Ghana, before concealing themselves inside the crane house. The vessel subsequently called at San Pedro, Côte d’Ivoire, where another security search was conducted.

According to Skuld, shore-based searches using trained dogs had been completed before departure from both ports. Nevertheless, the stowaways remained undetected until several days into the voyage.

Case 2: Seven stowaways boarded through the gangway

Approximately two months later, another vessel discovered seven Ghanaian stowaways following a port call at Tema.

The individuals reportedly gained access through the gangway and concealed themselves around the access ladder area of a cargo hold body hatch.

Despite third-party searches involving trained dogs, they remained hidden for several days after departure. Their presence was eventually revealed when they emerged in search of food and water.

What can be learned from these incidents?

Although the precise reasons why the stowaways escaped detection were not established, Skuld identified several vulnerabilities that warrant attention.

#1 Professional security searches have limitations

Both vessels underwent searches using trained dogs, but neither operation detected the concealed individuals. The cases demonstrate that third-party searches should be treated as an additional safeguard rather than conclusive evidence that a vessel is free of stowaways.

A negative search result does not eliminate the need for crew members to inspect potential hiding places physically.

#2 Accessible spaces can still be overlooked

The stowaways concealed themselves in a crane house and near a cargo hold access ladder. According to Skuld, neither location was particularly difficult to access or inspect. This raises questions about whether search teams were adequately familiar with the vessels’ layouts and whether all vulnerable spaces received sufficient attention.

The incidents also demonstrate why searches should be adapted to each vessel rather than relying exclusively on generic checklists.

#3 Gangway monitoring remains a critical security measure

In the second incident, the stowaways reportedly boarded through the gangway, highlighting the potential consequences of weaknesses in access control.

Busy cargo operations can complicate monitoring, particularly when stevedores, contractors and other shore personnel are moving frequently between the vessel and terminal. Access control should therefore remain effective throughout the port stay, with clear responsibilities for monitoring personnel movements.

#4 Search timing and thoroughness matter

Stowaways may change hiding places or gain access to previously inspected spaces before the vessel departs.

A search completed too early, or carried out without sufficient time to inspect vulnerable areas, may leave opportunities for individuals to remain undetected.

Skuld emphasizes that an effective inspection requires more than a visual check or the completion of a search certificate. Crew members must physically examine potential hiding places and verify that assigned areas have been properly searched.

Key safety recommendations

Based on the incidents, Skuld recommends a systematic approach to stowaway prevention, with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of physical searches.

• Conduct two searches where safe and practicable: The first should take place before departure from the berth, preferably after cargo operations and the departure of shore personnel. A second search should follow pilot disembarkation to identify anyone who may have boarded or changed hiding place.
• Allocate sufficient time: Depending on vessel size, type and configuration, a comprehensive search may require approximately three to four hours. This is a practical planning allowance rather than a fixed standard. Searches should not be shortened merely to meet departure schedules.
• Establish vessel-specific search zones: Assign designated crew members or teams to clearly defined areas, ensuring that potential hiding places are systematically inspected.
• Carry out thorough physical inspections: Check beneath ropes, safety nets, spare parts and other materials where safe, rather than relying solely on visual observations.
• Secure previously inspected areas: Control access to spaces that have already been searched and conduct additional checks when necessary.
• Maintain clear search records: Document inspected areas, responsible personnel, completion times and any locations that could not be safely or fully inspected. Outstanding checks should be reported to the Master or Ship Security Officer.
• Use third-party services as additional protection: Professional guards and trained search dogs can strengthen security arrangements but should not replace the vessel’s own inspections.

The two incidents demonstrate that the effectiveness of stowaway prevention depends not simply on whether security checks have been conducted, but on how thoroughly they are performed.

A search certificate or negative result from a trained dog does not necessarily confirm that every potential hiding place has been examined. Search planning, crew familiarity with vessel arrangements and sufficient time for inspections remain essential. As discussed in Stowaways: Prevention starts before departure, effective prevention requires a coordinated approach throughout the port stay.

The recent cases provide a further reminder that these arrangements must be implemented consistently and verified in practice.

source : safety4sea