Iran is Making Unimpeded Use of the Strait of Hormuz

Getting a clear picture of what traffic is currently passing through the Strait of Hormuz is difficult at present for the external observer. The US military and the Omani coast guard will have a complete picture, but ship trackers used to dependency on AIS signals are now deprived of their primary source of information, as vessels passing through the strait are clearly not wishing to advertise their presence and are traveling with AIS systems switched off. 

However, it is possible to discern the general pattern of movement. Iranian ships, or ships licensed by the Iranian authorities, are hiding their identities and are passing through the strait. A small number of vessels not approved by the Iranians are making the passage, but at high risk of being attacked.

In effect, the strait is open to Iranian or Iranian-approved traffic, and largely closed to others, meaning that the Iranians are suffering little economic damage – and may indeed be benefitting from high oil and gas prices – while the Gulf States are blockaded.

With Iranian approval, two passages have been made by laden Indian-flagged LPG tankers, the Shivalik (IMO 9356892) and the Nanda Devi (IMO 9232503), both owned by the parastatal Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), India’s largest shipping company. Both ships are known to have loaded Qatari gas at Ras Laffan beforehand. The two SCI ships were escorted through the strait by the Indian Navy. Lloyd’s List Intelligence also reported that an unidentified crude tanker laden with Saudi oil had also transited en route to India in the same time period.

The VLCC Smyrni (IMO 9493779), Liberian-flagged and managed by the Greek shipping company Dynacom, transited the strait en route to Mumbai sometime after March 5, laden with Saudi oil. It is not known if it had some form of permission based on the Indian destination of its cargo. Other Dynacom-managed ships are also believed to have made transits.

The Guinea-flagged oil products tanker Ocean Guardian (IMO 9267948) from Basra, Iraq transited eastwards on March 12. The Ocean Guardian, formerly the Danube, is OFAC-sanctioned with a classic shadow fleet history.

Another Basra-associated, OFAC-sanctioned oil products tanker, the Aruba-flagged Blooming Dale (IMO 9125724) was on March 13 transiting eastwards in the strait. The Belize-flagged bulk carrier Rozana (IMO 9198381), a frequent visitor to Russia, also seemed able to make an unhindered eastward passage of the strait on March 7.

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq has said that Iraqi-owned vessels are allowed passage if they are not US or Israeli-linked. ISW reported also that the Turkish Transport Ministry had allowed an unidentified Turkish-owned ship to leave the Gulf, and on March 7, the Panama-flagged but Turkish-owned LPG Bogazici (IMO 9237747) was seen entering the Gulf, hauling Emirati gas to India. The Marshall Islands-registered bulk carrier Iron Maiden (IMO 9691149) seems to have slipped through the strait heading for Singapore on March 4 by describing itself as “all Chinese-crewed” – a practice seen previously during the Red Sea crisis. 

Overall, this is an incomplete and somewhat confusing picture. Lloyd’s List Intelligence has picked up nine dark fleet transits of the strait in March, but assess that in total there have been 45 such transits – and probably much more. Lloyd’s List has also detected movements out of the Gulf of at least one Iranian container ship. Sky News’ Data & Forensics team estimates that 13 ships have transited the Strait of Hormuz from March 2-9. In among these ship movements are Iran-linked shadow fleet tankers, which are still loading crude oil at Kharg Island, Iran’s primary export hub.

It would be safe to conclude that while access needed by GCC states and the wider world has been choked off, Iran is enjoying economic and political benefit from the traffic it is allowing through the strait. This Iranian-sanctioned traffic is at well below pre-war levels, but is nonetheless keeping Iran afloat.

In contrast, the effects on those denied access are economically punitive and getting increasingly worse. It is also politically corrosive to the American war effort: those states suffering from the Iranian blockade are now agitating for an early end to the war, before U.S. aims are achieved.

The obvious solution is not the easiest. A military operation to lift Iranian control over the strait would be a complex and challenging, and it is not clear if there are sufficient naval forces available to conduct convoy operations successfully. Even if escorts were available, independent estimates suggest that the logistical math of convoy operation would restrict tanker traffic volume to a small fraction of normal levels, per Lloyd’s List. 

The alternative would be to impose an economic blockade and to interdict Iranian ships. This latter course has the benefit of hitting the finances of the Iranian regime, which needs money both to maintain its machinery of state suppression and to keep the Iranian economy afloat through subsidies. Militarily, now that the United States has swept the Iranian navy from the seas, it has an interdiction tool available for the task: the expected arrival in theater of the 2,200 Marines of the 31st MEU. Such an operation would require political patience, a commodity which currently is in short supply, and would strain the U.S. operating model of involving Coast Guard law enforcement in every vessel boarding. 

Iran also has a Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) off the Kooh Mobarak oil storage facility on the Jask peninsula outside the Gulf, built in order to reduce dependency on Kharg Island. It takes generally two days to load a VLCC tanker moored at the SBM. But since it was opened in July 2021 by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, the facility has only been used sporadically, reflecting construction problems with Iran’s crude pipeline infrastructure serving the Jask terminal. The SBM does not appear to have been used at all in January and February this year.

source : maritime-executive