Ocean Security: South Asia and the Indian Ocean Part 2

‘Ocean Security: South Asia and the Indian Ocean’

24 Oct 2023

• Following is the keynote address delivered by international relations expert Nilanthi Samaranayake at the Conference on ‘Ocean Security: South Asia and the Indian Ocean’ organised by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies

This is the final part of a two-part series of articles. The first was published in the 24 October issue. Click here for the first part.

Coming back to the Indian Ocean, there’s no United States (US) strategy document that’s been released which articulates Washington’s interest specifically in this region. As you know, the US has developed a national strategy focused on the wider “Indo-Pacific” region since 2017. This regional focus has evolved over the past decade, including in consultation with allies and partners, after years of being focused on the Asia-Pacific as a geographic planning construct. 

A read of the three highest-level US strategy documents released last year – the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, and Indo-Pacific Strategy – shows that the Indian Ocean has only one substantive reference in each of the three documents. 

In the absence of a clear strategy for this region, US strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean must therefore be inferred. 

Based on my personal research of the region, I see three core objectives that the US has. The first is ensuring the free flow of commerce in the Indian Ocean. This trade is critical to the global economy for hydrocarbons, containers, and bulk cargo. The US focus on this objective can be seen with the deployment of forces and personnel this summer to US Naval Forces Central Command in the Middle East, after Iran’s activity threatened merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz area. Despite its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US commitment to the objective of freedom of the seas and secure sealanes appears constant. 

I see the second objective as maintaining US military access to the Indian Ocean. The US is an extra-regional power with no resident territories like France has, for example. Therefore, it seeks military basing and access, not only for combat-support purposes as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to aid in the provision of humanitarian assistance and relief after disasters like the 2004 tsunami, cyclones in the Bay of Bengal, and in Mozambique. 

I see the third objective as seeking to keep the Indian Ocean in its current peaceful state and not wanting it to assume greater priority for US strategic interests, given its already increased priorities in the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans. A review of US strategy and policy toward the Indo-Pacific suggests the primacy of US interests in the Pacific segment, given several US states and territories in this region as well as US military presence in the western Pacific. The US also has homeland defence objectives in the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic oceans. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year highlighted the reasons behind US moves that were already underway to devote greater attention to security of the Atlantic and Arctic theatres. 

US strategy and Indian Ocean

So given the United States’ priorities in these regions and constraints on allocating its resources globally, what does this mean for US security strategy in the Indian Ocean? I think this means Washington needs the Indian Ocean to be stable. It doesn’t want it to flare up into a crisis. It supports allies and partners who contribute to regional stability and has placed particular emphasis on India in its approach. And it seeks to preserve its access to the region – not only for itself, certainly, but with benefit to others. 

The Freedom of Navigation programme is a visible example of the US policy to maintain freedom of the seas, and for ships and aircraft to operate where international law allows. This is a controversial programme, and is often referenced in media for freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. However, the programme has its origins more than 40 years ago and speaks to a core US interest of freedom of the seas.

Now for Indian Ocean countries, I think this US objective of seeking stability here aligns with the state and norms of the region, especially when compared with the more turbulent waters of the Pacific.

I see three enablers of stability in this region. First, the Indian Ocean is not characterised by rampant territorial disputes. Certainly, there are some current maritime boundary disputes, but not of the fiery kind seen to the east. Second, the shared focus on economics and secure sealanes has promoted cooperation in the Indian Ocean, as seen in counter-piracy deployments. This is even between countries whose capitals have high-profile disagreements. Yet operational-level cooperation continues at sea due to converging interests in this region. Third, the Indian Ocean has seen an embrace of international legal venues to resolve maritime boundary disputes. This is particularly the case in the Bay of Bengal, with mechanisms used and respected such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This stands in contrast to the Pacific, such as the Philippines-China legal dispute in 2016. Moreover, Sri Lanka has emphasised its commitment to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as it’s developed standard operating procedures for visiting ships. 

These enablers of stability reflect the unique strengths of the Indian Ocean and should not be forgotten when much attention is given to the wider Indo-Pacific region. 

Non-traditional security challenge

In addition to these large strategic issues, the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies conference is importantly examining the various non-traditional security issues that confront the region. For example, there are sessions on the blue economy, environmental security, and irregular crime in the Indian Ocean. The waters of the western Indian Ocean prominently saw pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa roughly a decade ago, as well as the ensuing multinational naval response to escort ships and ensure secure sealanes. Through a combination of procedures implemented by the shipping industry and through naval escorts, incidents of piracy went down. This was a clear success story of cooperation in the Indian Ocean when facing a non-traditional security challenge. 

Today, there’s a need for greater multinational cooperation on other non-traditional security challenges. This includes narcotics trafficking to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing to gender issues. Regarding women, peace, and security (WPS), Sri Lanka earlier this year adopted its first National Action Plan to meet its obligations under the UN’s WPS resolution. In South Asia, Bangladesh had previously completed its own National Action Plan. These developments serve as examples for other South Asian countries to advance gender security and their WPS commitments. 

Regarding IUU fishing, 20% of the world’s tuna catch comes from the western Indian Ocean alone, and regional countries see IUU fishing in their exclusive economic zones. But gathering robust IUU data that is collected from across the various countries in the region has been a challenge. Regional information fusion centres from Madagascar to Singapore are serving as an important next-step in trying to provide operational-level data and information-sharing where possible to work toward more fundamental policy solutions. 

In another example, the busy sea lanes of the Indian Ocean have seen some of the worst shipping accidents in the past few years. At the western edge of the Indian Ocean, Mauritius declared a “state of environmental emergency” in 2020 after the MV Wakashio ship ran aground and spilled oil. Two months later, the MT New Diamond oil tanker caught fire off the east coast of Sri Lanka and leaked diesel fuel over an area of 25 miles. Then in 2021, the X-Press Pearl container ship caught fire and subsequently sank, and emptied its contents into the sea and off Sri Lanka’s western coast. It’s been called “the worst marine plastic pollution event in the world”. While greater attention has been devoted to managing natural disasters in the Indian Ocean and South Asia as well as boosting resilience, more study of human-caused incidents and the effects of marine pollution on environmental security are needed. 

When examining both traditional security and non-traditional security issues, it’s also worth remembering the interconnectedness of these concepts. 

In fact, we’ve seen how non-traditional security challenges and cooperation to address them can sometimes result in traditional security outcomes that were unforeseen at the time. For example, the strategic grouping known as the Quad is often framed in terms of geopolitics and its contrasts with China. Yet, this grouping had its origins in operational-level coordination between the US, India, Japan, and Australia over the provision of disaster relief after the 2004 tsunami struck the Indian Ocean. A second example is that the severity of piracy once resulted in many nations’ naval deployments to the western Indian Ocean. This included China, which gained significant experience in learning how to operate naval ships in waters far from home. The traditional security outcome of roughly 15 years of its continued deployments to the Indian Ocean is clear for multiple stakeholders in the region and in daily media headlines.  

Research significant

In the context of these dynamics, your work in conducting research on South Asia and the Indian Ocean has tremendous importance. You are, in effect, writing a history of the contemporary era in your assessments. You’re identifying strategic-level and tactical-level challenges for particular countries or the wider region. And you’re developing ideas for policy solutions to the problems you’ve identified. Policymakers are busy with their various duties, so you’re informing their thinking by drawing on your research findings and time spent analysing in depth the various problems of ocean security. 

I hope you all will set a goal to publish the findings of the papers that you’ll present today – in some form, if not the entire paper – and also seek multiple venues for pieces of your wider research. This is increasingly possible through the proliferation of online media outlets. Your work will inform policymakers from your respective countries and ideally contribute to ocean security and resilience.

I look forward to the opportunity that awaits you as you begin this conference and the discussions you’ll have as you get to know fellow researchers from other countries in the region; understand the national aspirations and challenges they see in the Indian Ocean and South Asia; and identify shared interests to envision ideas for regional cooperation. 

Congratulations again on presenting your papers, and I wish you a successful conference.

(Nilanthi Samaranayake has 25 years of experience in the nonprofit research sector. Samaranayake’s work focuses on regional security in the Indian Ocean, smaller South Asian countries, non-traditional security issues, US alliances and partnerships, and small states in international affairs. Samaranayake received a master’s degree in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a bachelor’s in international studies from American University, and completed a fellowship at the National Bureau of Asian Research)

–———————————————————————————-

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication.