Trade Corridor Wars: Escalating Competition Between China, Russia, Iran and the West

Contemporary conflicts are increasingly orchestrated across multiple nations and domains, manifesting in many ways, from conventional ground engagements to strategic influence operations. The informal coalition of China, Iran, Russia, and most recently North Korea (CIRN) represents a counter-influence regional network, challenging the geopolitical and economic sway of the United States and the broader West. While North Korea has joined Russian forces in Ukraine and is mostly visible for its political and military posturings, China, Iran and Russia are closely working together on building a new trade and investment platform to support their political agenda.

Although we are not yet living a full-scale global war, a global economic confrontation is underway, which could be a prelude to overt military hostilities. This paradigm shift arguably began in 2022, when Russia blocked Ukraine’s access to Black Sea trade routes, obstructing its critical export channels to the global market, a move that was met with Western sanctions. Over the past two years, the CIRN coalition (also referred to as CRINK, to include the full acronym for North Korea) has grown increasingly prominent, while trade and investment corridors have been strategically realigned by both Western and anti-Western blocs: reflecting a recalibration of global economic dependencies and a restructuring of the world’s economy.

I prefer the acronym CIRN to describe the informal alliance among China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, as it captures the partnership’s essential dynamics. North Korea’s involvement in support of Russia’s actions in Ukraine likely depended on China’s tacit approval—if nothing else, its troops would have relied on Chinese transport routes to reach Russia. Thus, this partnership is best understood as a China-Iran-Russia network, a strategic yet informal partnership focused on advancing each country’s interests while steadily countering Western influence, particularly across Eurasia.

This informal coalition became especially evident in 2022 when Russia initiated the global economic confrontation by disrupting established trade routes. Since then, CIRN has actively explored alternative pathways for influence and trade, leveraging its position to challenge the West’s diminishing dominance on the global stage.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have had two major consequences. The first is the increased strain and detrimental impact on marine transportation and logistics. Not only has the cost of international shipping and insurance risen, causing inflationary pressures, but there is also a potential that conflict would threaten the open and free sea lines, generating challenges and modifications to UN regulations. The second main impact of the two interconnected conflicts, considering their effects on the global economy, is the redefining of land trade routes since freight flows over old Eurasian routes have decreased dramatically since 2022.

The Northern Corridor, or New Eurasian Land Bridge, has long functioned as the principal freight artery connecting Asia and Europe. This transcontinental railway system stretches from China through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, offering a cohesive infrastructure due to a unified track gauge and regulatory alignment under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation of Railways. These harmonized technical standards and coordinated governance mechanisms have historically reinforced the corridor’s strategic dominance in Eurasian trade flows. But the Ukraine war resulted in sanctions and uncertainty, and transportation along the route decreased. In 2023, westbound shipping volumes along this route decreased by 51 percent compared to the previous year and eastbound volumes to China were 44 percent below 2022 levels.

As a result, both the Southern Corridor (which begins in China, crosses Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey to reach the Mediterranean and Europe) and the Middle Corridor (which starts in China, crosses Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and the Black Sea) have emerged as critical trade routes between Europe and China, reshaping the global dynamics of transport and trade. While China has reallocated much of its commercial traffic, Russia has, since 2022, accelerated its investment into operationalizing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking the Northern ports of Russia to the ports of Iran through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. The INSTC is also a shorter and more cost-effective alternative to traditional routes like the Suez Canal.

When considering the geography of these corridors, various observations may be made. First, Turkey seems to be a common denominator for the Middle Corridor and the Southern Corridor. Second, while one of the variants of the Middle Corridor does not include Turkey, instead relying on an open and free Black Sea, both the Middle and Southern Corridor are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Third, Iran is at the crossroads of the Southern Corridor and the INSTC.

Furthermore, given the rising coordination between CIRN’s members, Tehran sees a chance to collaborate with both Russia and China in constructing the North-South Corridor and expanding its participation in what China refers to as the Silk Belt and Road Initiative. After all, Iran has been looking to establish parallel trade networks and systems for years before 2022 because of its own economic problems coming from being sanctioned by the United States and some other Western states due to its nuclear program.

In the summer of 2024, Moscow and Tehran were set to invest about $25 billion into developing internal waterways and railways to link Saint Petersburg to the ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas. Also this summer, Iran inaugurated its first freight train to China, as part of what it referred to as the China-Iran-Europe rail corridor. On its way to China, the Iranian train will pass via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, being part of the Southern Corridor project.

In this sense, Iran becomes a natural link in the CIRN informal alliance, providing a logistical foundation for informal coordination and allowing the counter-influence regional network to more effectively push back against the West. While this may be seen as a Russian reaction to Western sanctions and a means for China to continue cooperating with Russia for economic reasons, their investment in new trade and investment corridors has a long-term strategic goal. Making these pathways operational and successful means not only (literally) creating new methods to collaborate, but also making their own decoupling from the West simpler and, in the process, laying the groundwork for more formal multidimensional collaboration, which will encourage more actors to join them.

The development of new trade corridors can be seen as a strategic step in advancing a broader global movement to counterbalance Western dominance. These discussions revolve around debates calling for non-alignment, a greater role for south-south cooperation and BRICS. Although BRICS has yet to deliver significant economic results, it has functioned effectively as a political magnet, attracting countries eager to explore potential economic benefits beyond the group’s political summits.

Turkey, notably, has shown interest in joining BRICS since 2018, in a move that was meant to showcase the country’s growing regional power along with its multidimensional foreign policy approach. Most recently, in September 2024, reports emerged that Turkey had formally applied to join BRICS, with Russian officials confirming the application. However, Turkish officials have been ambiguous, stating that the process is ongoing without confirming a formal application, and as of November 2024, Turkey’s membership status remains uncertain, with no official confirmation of acceptance into the BRICS group. Turkey’s non-alignment with the West in sanctioning Russia and its posturing in the Black Sea as a key negotiator between Russia and the West on Ukraine has challenged its alliance with the West, even if it is a NATO member.

At the same time, Turkey and China have grown closer as bilateral commerce and investment have developed and high-level visits have become more frequent in recent years. Moreover, the Chinese consortium comprising COSCO Pacific, China Merchants Holdings International, and CIC Capital acquired a 65 percent stake in Kumport in 2015, marking the most important Chinese investment in a Turkish Black Sea port—back then part of the Belt and Road Initiative and now effectively part of the Middle Corridor.

Turkey’s strategic balancing act between Russia, China, and the West, along with its position along vital East-West trade routes, has significant implications for alternative corridors. Turkey’s role could strengthen these routes’ capacity to facilitate non-Western trade flows, aligning with CIRN’s broader objectives. Given its complex relationship with the United States, Turkey has long leveraged its ties with Russia—and now its expanding relationship with China—to bolster its strategic influence with Washington. Observing the US pivot away from Eurasia and the Middle East, which Ankara interprets as a weakening American presence in the region, Turkey sees the opportunity to use its ties with China and Russia not only for economic interests but also to ensure it remains aligned with the region’s strongest emerging powers.

Turkey is not alone in the Black Sea region in welcoming Chinese investments aimed at enhancing trade corridors. In recent years, China has deepened its economic footprint in Georgia, prioritizing infrastructure and strategic projects with significant regional implications. In May 2024, a Chinese-led consortium secured the contract to develop the Anaklia deep-sea port on Georgia’s Black Sea coast: a project poised to bolster Georgia’s role in the Middle Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Alongside this, Chinese firms have undertaken major infrastructure projects, such as constructing the Kvesheti-Kobi tunnel, the largest in Georgia, which further integrates the country into China’s growing trans-Eurasian trade network. These ventures underscore China’s strategic interest in positioning Georgia as a critical transit hub, in line with its broader goals of strengthening connectivity and influence across Eurasia.

China’s strategy to expand its presence along Eurasian trade corridors hinges not only on constructing these routes but also on ensuring they are competitive and attractive to transporters. Assessing the competitiveness of these corridors—essential for understanding which routes are most viable for Asia-Europe transit—a July 2024 study evaluated various corridors based on current operational characteristics. The findings revealed that the Traditional Maritime Corridor leads in performance with a competitiveness index of 0.7203 (on a scale from 0 to 1). Following this are the Trans-Siberian Corridor at 0.4056, and then the Middle and Southern Corridors, with similar performance indices of 0.2864 and 0.2662, respectively.

To counter China and the CIRN informal alliance in their bid to expand influence across Eurasia—and potentially reshape global trade dynamics through corridors like the North-South route, which Russia is developing and which links the East-West networks to global maritime pathways—the West must actively work to bolster its presence along these strategic routes. Achieving this would require not only increasing Western investments in these transit corridors, but also strategically prioritizing routes less vulnerable to CIRN influence. Investing in these corridors offers a strong return, not only because there is a clear business rationale for alternatives to the Northern Corridor—which is likely to remain under-utilized, given that even after the Ukraine war ends, Russia’s reintegration into European trade will face substantial challenges—but also because such investments enable the West to maintain influence in the rapidly evolving infrastructure landscape, ensuring a balanced role in shaping global economic and trade routes.

From a geostrategic standpoint, China’s central role in all trade routes connecting Asia makes disrupting CIRN dependent on Western investment in alternative corridors that bypass Iran and limit reliance on Turkey. Turkey’s approach, balancing alliances and prioritizing immediate gains, has led it to align more closely with China and, at times, accommodate Russia, adding a layer of uncertainty. While Europe may tolerate this ambiguity, given its lower exposure to the impacts of a functional CIRN alliance on open global trade routes, the United States cannot afford such leniency. The United States relies on the smooth functioning of global maritime routes, which is one of its key geopolitical imperatives. Therefore, the United States needs to be aware and mitigate against any shift CIRN might introduce to current trade norms.

The intersection between Russia’s North-South Corridor and the Middle and Southern Corridors, where China is expanding influence, poses a challenge not only for Eurasia but for the entire international trade system. Given China and Russia’s stated long-term goals to reduce Western influence in global markets, the design of these corridors highlights their intent to establish a foundation toward that objective. Though not intended for the short or medium term, should these new corridors establish rules that undermine the existing norms of open, free navigation—currently upheld by Western standards—the impact would reverberate across global trade.

It is therefore likely that the West—both Europe and the United States—will explore ways to counter the influence projected by the CIRN alliance in Eurasia, including close examination of the development of current trade corridors. The Middle Corridor has two variants: one that reaches Europe via Turkey and the Mediterranean, and another that connects to Europe through the Black Sea, accessing Romanian and Bulgarian ports. Alongside the Southern Corridor, these routes can be grouped as Middle Corridor A and Middle Corridor B, with a comparison highlighting the regions and countries they traverse. This analysis shows that the most favorable East-West corridor for the West, in terms of control and minimal complications, is Middle Corridor B. This route stretches from China through Central Asia and the Caucasus, then across the Black Sea directly into Europe, offering a reliable pathway with reduced geopolitical risks.

The trade corridor variant that bypasses both Iran and Turkey goes through the Black Sea, an area currently at risk of escalating conflict. Russia’s strategic aim to control Ukraine’s southern coast, underscored by increasing attacks on the port of Odesa in recent months, heightens the security concerns surrounding this route. While currently the Middle Corridor is slightly more competitive than the Southern Corridor considering the current operational status of multi-modal infrastructure, sustained Western support for investment could make it more feasible. At the same time, it may be that, through the process, and as the war in Ukraine ends in a favorable way to the West, the Black Sea is getting back to an open and free sea, considering the interest of allowing for trade passage.

Western efforts to develop the Middle Corridor and promote an “open Central Asia” that welcomes investment beyond Chinese and Russian influence are already showing results. The EU-Central Asia Strategy and US involvement in regional connectivity projects have contributed to Kazakhstan’s decision not to join BRICS in 2024, instead encouraging it to focus on its economic growth. Instead, the West’s emphasis on regional cooperation without explicit bloc politics aligns well with Kazakhstan’s independent foreign policy stance. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, which funds infrastructure projects, reflecting its openness to Western-backed development.

The development of Middle Corridor B—the route that reaches Europe via the Black Sea—could play a pivotal role in keeping the South Caucasus open to Western-backed growth, even amid its engagement with Russia and China. This potential rests on two factors.

First, as long as Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, remains receptive to collaborating with the West on infrastructure projects, the South Caucasus stands to benefit from this openness. Second, the expansion of Middle Corridor B aligns with the Western “containment line” that spans from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Adriatic. This initiative, also known as the Three Seas Initiative, aims to enhance infrastructure for both economic and military purposes and has become increasingly important since the war in Ukraine has started.

This strategic focus has already spurred substantial investment in key port facilities like Gdansk and Constanta, along with the development of a railway connection between them. Looking ahead, these efforts may also support transforming the Danube into a commercial corridor with dual-use potential for military logistics. Simultaneously, the Via Carpathia, a transnational highway network linking the Baltic Sea to the Aegean and Black Seas to strengthen north-south transport and regional trade, remains a high priority for the Three Seas Initiative. While many projects receive EU funding, they also attract significant private investment, sustaining the idea that return on investment is higher than most other classic infrastructure projects.

The success of this vision rests on the West’s, particularly the US ability to grasp the challenge posed by the informal CIRN alliance of China, Iran, Russia, and the support from North Korea, and on its commitment to formulating effective counterstrategies. At its core, much will depend on whether the Black Sea remains an open and accessible maritime area. If the conflict in Ukraine escalates in the coming months and Russia secures more of Ukraine’s coastline, the Black Sea could take on a new strategic character, quite different from a scenario where Russia is forced to withdraw, allowing Ukraine to reclaim its exclusive economic zone there. In the first case, the CIRN alliance would gain not only territory but also a stronger influence over the definition of “free and open” trade corridors—an outcome with potential repercussions for maritime trade not only in the region but worldwide.

source : fpri